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Global diffusion of laws: The case of minimum age of
marriage legislation, 1965–2015
Irem Ebetürk
WZB Berlin Social Science Center, Berlin, Germany
ABSTRACT
The majority of countries in the world have laws setting the minimum age of
marriage at 18 years old. This is a global legislative trend that intensified
greatly in the 1990s. What explains this trend? To answer this question, I
conduct quantitative analyses of factors influencing legislation setting the
minimum age of marriage at 18. I analyse time-series data for 167 countries
from 1965 to 2015 to examine which countries were early adopters of
legislation. Drawing on world society theory, I theorise that global level
institutionalisation of norms concerning women and children is the key to
understand the passing of minimum age of marriage laws. Findings indicate
that world cultural scripts and the presence of women legislators are the
main impetus behind the fight against child marriage. Countries with a
Muslim majority are less likely to pass laws setting the minimum age of
marriage at 18.
ARTICLE HISTORY Received 20 April 2020; Accepted 5 February 2021
KEYWORDS Global sociology; child marriage; human rights; globalization; world society theory
Introduction
In September 2013, the United Nations Human Rights Council and
General Assembly adopted a resolution dedicated to child, early, and
forced marriage. This is the first resolution to explicitly and exclusively
address the issue. The resolution recognises child, early, and forced mar-
riage as a human rights and development issue and declares that ‘it con-
stitutes a violation, abuse or impairment of human rights, that it prevents
individuals from living their lives free from all forms of violence and that
it has adverse consequences on the enjoyment of human rights, such as
the right to education, the right to the highest attainable standard of
health, including sexual and reproductive health’ (UNHRC, 2013).
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It was not until the 1960s that states started to pass marriage laws setting
the minimum age at 18, the presumed age of adulthood. In the 1990s, this
has become a global legislative trend. In addition to this trend, child mar-
riage became a focus of concern for many international non-governmental
organisations (INGOs) and multilateral organisations. The movement
against child marriage received a great deal of global attention particularly
after mid-2000s. The years between 2004 and 2010 witnessed the emer-
gence of girls as the new agents and objects of international development.
With the launching of the International Day of the Girl in 2012 by the UN,
and Malala Yousafzai’s selection at the age of 17 as the Nobel Peace Prize
winner in 2014, it would not be an exaggeration to say that adolescent girls
have become the most important element of international development.
From the very beginning, campaigns on behalf of adolescent girls men-
tioned child marriage as an impediment to development goals.
As a response to the movement, legislation against child marriage con-
tinues to feature on the agenda of governments around the world (for a
complete list of countries and years of legislation see Appendix 1). In June
2017, two countries passed laws regarding child marriage: Germany
passed a new law that makes the marriage age strictly 18, without excep-
tions (The Local, 2017) while the Dominican Republic voted for a similar
law (Plan International, 2017). Malawi is another country that raised the
minimum age of marriage to 18 recently, in April 2017 (Girls Not Brides,
2017a). Despite their differences, these three countries are taking or dis-
cussing legislative steps in the same direction, to reduce child marriage.
What explains this global legislative shift that started haltingly in the
1960s and 1970s and intensified greatly in the 1990s? (see Figure 1)
Figure 1. Cumulative number of countries with new minimum age legislation (set at
age 18) by year.
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Which countries are faster to adopt minimum age of marriage legis-
lation? These are the major research questions addressed in this paper.
I draw upon event history analyses of 167 countries from 1965 to 2015
and examine what factors help explain which countries were early adop-
ters of minimum age of marriage legislation.
Construction of child marriage as a global problem – the role of
international organisations
In the international arena, marriage is mentioned for the first-time in 1948
with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations, 1948).
The UDHR defines an ideal marriage with respect to age, presence of full
consent, and equality within marriage. In international law the issue of
child marriage was first addressed in the 1962 Convention on Consent to
Marriage, MinimumAge forMarriage and Registration ofMarriages (here-
after: 1962 Convention). The 1962 Convention appeals to all member states
to take measures to abolish ‘certain’ customs regarding marriage, to open
the way for ‘complete freedom in the choice of a spouse’ and ‘eliminating
completely child marriages and the betrothal of young girls before the
age of puberty’ (United Nations, 1962). The 1965 Recommendation on
Consent toMarriage, MinimumAge forMarriage and Registration ofMar-
riages, which was a non-binding recommendation that accompanied the
1962 Convention, specified the minimum age recommendation and
declared that the ‘age of marriage should be no less than 15 years unless
a competent authority agrees that there are serious reasons to provide
otherwise’. Although the 1962 Convention was an important treaty, as it
is the first that addresses the issue, it was signed by only 16 countries,
most of which expressed reservations (United Nations, 1962).
The second crucial international treaty concerning child marriage
was the 1979 Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimi-
nation against Women (CEDAW). With CEDAW, child marriage
started to be defined as a human rights and gender equality
problem. CEDAW provides that the ‘betrothal and the marriage of a
child shall have no legal effect, and all necessary action, including legis-
lation, shall be taken to specify a minimum age for marriage and to
make the registration of marriages in an official registry compulsory’
(United Nations, 1979). With CEDAW, for the first time in an inter-
national document the minimum age of marriage was recommended
to be 18. Moreover, CEDAW urged states to legislate against child
marriage by prohibiting it.
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International treaties not only suggest ways to prevent child marriage,
but they also promote an ideal form of marriage. The UDHR defines an
ideal marriage with respect to age (‘men and women of full age’), the
presence of ‘full and free consent of the intending spouses’, and presence
of equal rights ‘as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution’
(UDHR, Article 16). Following the UDHR, the 1962 Marriage Conven-
tion reiterates that ‘men and women of full age, without any limitation
due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to
found a family’ and ‘free and full consent of the intending spouses’
should be present (United Nations, 1962). In addition to the UDHR,
the 1962 Convention urges states to commit themselves to ‘take legisla-
tive action to specify a minimum age for marriage’. The Convention
says that certain customs, laws and practices are inconsistent with the
UDHR and states should abolish them by ensuring ‘complete freedom
in the choice of a spouse, eliminating completely child marriages and
the betrothal of young girls before the age of puberty’. The 1962 Conven-
tion signifies the characteristics of the normative marriage: free consent
of both parties and maturity. It was a big step toward institutionalising
the notion of the freely consenting individual, unconstrained by familial
or other demands. Although contested, such notions of marriage are now
world-cultural: they ‘present themselves as generally applicable and
meaningful throughout the world’ (Boli, 2005, p. 385).
A global civil society mobilisation against child marriage began in the
early 1990s within the context of the international women’s movement
following the 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women (Beijing Plat-
form). Unlike the second wave of civil society mobilisation in the
2000s, this first wave did not explicitly focus on child marriage itself.
Rather, it was a part of the international mobilisation of women’s
rights and opening up of international organisations such as the UN to
women’s rights advocacy in unprecedented ways. Even though, child
marriage was not their exclusive agenda, as a result of this high-level
international mobilisation, rights of women and girls became an indis-
pensable part of international development and global agenda-setting.
Within the context of 1990s, child marriage was discussed as a human
rights issue with respect to its negative outcomes in terms of gender
equality, women’s health, decision-making capabilities, risk of domestic
violence, and educational opportunities. In addition to being a gender
equality issue, the children’s rights approach which defines children as
subjects bearing rights and in need of protection is another perspective
from which the international community has considered the problem
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of child marriage. With the global institutionalisation of children’s rights
(Boyle, 2007) and the emergence of the 1989 United Nations Convention
on the Rights of the Child (hereafter CRC), the issue came to be seen not
only about gender but also about children’s rights. In other words, with
the CRC a certain definition of childhood is culturally institutionalised
and became legitimate in the global realm. This opened a new way to
depict child marriage as a problematic practice. Even though the CRC
does not have any explicit references to the issue of child marriage,
after the second half of 1990s the CRC is frequently referred to in cam-
paigns against child marriage, notably its articles on abolishing sexual
abuse and sexual exploitation (United Nations, 1989). The CRC is an
embodiment of an idealised version of childhood in which marriage
does not have a place. After 1990s, the international community empha-
sised the fact that marriage happens to children and robs them of a
normal childhood. The development community frames child marriage
as an agency-depriving practice which ‘robs girls of their ability to
reach their full potential’ (Mathur, Greene, & Malhotra, 2003, p. 4).
Not only can girls not resist their families’ decisions since they are not
autonomous, but because they get married when they are children,
they experience further difficulties in becoming autonomous individuals.
Accordingly, one of the reasons child marriage should be eliminated is
that it is an impediment to an ideal childhood through which an ideal
individual is created. In that sense, child marriage interrupts the ideal
life course of the individual. Hence, the construction of child marriage
as a global problem is closely related to global cultural conceptions of
the individual, an idealised version of childhood, and growing awareness
of the need for gender equality. Individual rights (i.e. human rights), chil-
dren’s rights, and women’s rights are pervasive global scripts with policy
outcomes. This does not mean that there is no contestation over those but
overall these are issues of low-contestation and high convergence.
The exclusive advocacy of INGOs for minimum age of marriage legis-
lation started in the second half of 1990s. Following the advocacy efforts,
scholars also started to examine the issue of child marriage with respect to
its harmful effects. A great majority of studies have been conducted by
public health researchers and child marriage is used mainly as an inde-
pendent variable. These studies examine the effect of child marriage on
fertility (Raj, Saggurti, Balaiah, & Silverman, 2009), women’s reproduc-
tive health (Kamal & Hassan, 2015), infant health (Raj, 2010), mental
health (Le Strat, Dubertret, & Le Foll, 2011), HIV rates (Bruce, 2005;
Raj & Boehmer, 2013), educational attainment (Nguyen & Wodon,
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2012; Raj, McDougal, Silverman, & Rusch, 2014), rates of violence against
women (Speizer & Pearson, 2011), and economic development (Parsons
et al., 2015). In all these studies, findings indicate negative effects of child
marriage in different spheres of society.
The first concentrated international advocacy effort was put forward
by the Forum on Marriage and the Rights of Women and Girls. The
Forum was established in 1998 and is a network of UK-based NGOs,
Human Rights Watch, Oxfam, UNICEF, and the ILO. It was effective
in bringing the issue to the attention of the UN. In return, for the first
time, UNICEF published a report on law and marriage around the
world and supported local NGOs working on the issue.
The second wave of mobilisation by INGOs that pushes the legislation
forward came in the second half of 2000s with the foundation of Girls not
Brides in 2008. Girls not Brides is a civil society partnership that consists
of 1300 organisations in 100 countries. Following the foundation of Girls
not Brides, INGOs pushed the UN for understanding the current status
of marriage legislation globally. As a result, in 2013, the OHCHR sent out
a questionnaire to NGOs, states, and consultants around the world to
collect information on the law as well as its implementations. Many
local NGOs as well as INGOs sent out reports summarising the current
state of affairs in their geographical area and came up with an action
plan. Starting from the second half of the 2000s, these action plans
came to be discussed under the leadership of Girls not Brides and
strengthened the global character of the movement. Civil society partner-
ships such as the Girls not Brides have been effective in creating aware-
ness to the status of minimum age of marriage laws and through its
leadership NGOs all over the world share their experiences with each
other on what works to push the governments for marriage age legis-
lation. As such, INGOs are effective in bringing the issue to the attention
of key international organisations such as the UN.
Global influences on minimum age of marriage legislation
Studies focusing on legislation against child marriage or minimum age of
marriage laws examine the interplay between international norms and
domestic politics. For instance, Toyo (2006) discusses this issue with
respect to the Nigerian Child Rights Act (CRA) of 2003. The CRA set
the minimum age at 18 but the Nigerian Constitution does not establish
a minimum age of marriage. Toyo argues that critics framed the CRA as
emanating ‘not from national but from the international arena’ and it was
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an ‘invasion of what is basically a private sphere’ (1302). Both Moschetti
(2005) and Desai and Andrist (2010) argue that age of marriage laws is an
important arena of collision between colonial ideology and nationalist
Indian ideology. Other scholars focus on the effect of minimum age of
marriage laws on actual child marriage rates. Cammack, Young, and
Heaton (1996) found that marriage age laws have had no effect on the
actual rates of child marriage in Indonesia. Momeni (1972) reached
similar conclusions in his study focusing on Iran. More recently Lee-
Rife, Malhotra, Warner, and Glinski (2012) also found that the Indonesian
Marriage Act of 1974 did not lead to significant changes in the trends of
child marriage. One of the most comprehensive descriptive studies of
child marriage legislation is that by the World Health Organisation
(WHO) and the Inter-Parliamentary Union in 2015. This study reviewed
current legislation against child marriage in 37 Asia-Pacific Countries
and concluded that child marriage rates remained high even in the pres-
ence of strong legislative measures against it (Scolaro et al., 2015).
None of the sources mentioned above examined the legislation against
child marriage in a global level or asked how and why the legal minimum
age of marriage is increasing globally. These questions entail a macro-
level comparative approach both theoretically and methodologically.
I rely mainly on world society theory to generate explanatory hypotheses
on passing marriage age legislation. For world society theory (hereafter
WST), states passing laws in accordance with pervasive global scripts are
not coincidental. WST assumes that worldwide cultural and associational
processes are the main mechanisms that constitute actors and action
(Boli & Thomas, 1999). In this model, world culture refers to the:
culture of world society, comprising norms and knowledge shared across state
boundaries, rooted in nineteenth century Western culture but since globalised,
promoted by nongovernmental organisations as well as for-profit corpor-
ations, intimately tied to the rationalisation of institutions, enacted on particu-
lar occasions that generate global awareness, carried by the infrastructure of
world society, spurred by market forces, riven by tension and contradiction,
and expressed in the multiple ways particular groups relate to universal
ideas. (Lechner & Boli, 2005, p. 6)
WST assumes the structural dominance of a rationalised, global insti-
tutional and cultural order in which all other units, such as nation-states,
organisations and individuals, are embedded. In terms of the decision-
making processes of nation states, it highlights the world-cultural prin-
ciples upon which the world cultural order is founded. Nation-states
around the world have similar structures and implement similar
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models of development, health or education because they conform to
‘dominant, legitimated or taken-for-granted views’ resulting from
world culture (Schofer, Hironaka, Frank, & Longhofer, 2012). WST scho-
lars count ‘rationalisation, universalism, belief in progress and individu-
alism’ as crucial cultural assumptions of the world polity (ibid). These
cultural principles are institutionalised as normative rules in the world
polity. ForWST, actors do not act so much as enact these cultural models.
Unlike the rational-actor assumptions of the majority of sociological
theories of globalisation, WST emphasises culture and norms as consti-
tutive of action. For WST, states or individuals do not always make
decisions on the basis of what is rational or what is functional; rather,
they conform to dominant frames of reference. One of the most impor-
tant reasons for this conformity is the concern to be seen as being legit-
imate in the eyes of others. This applies to actors at various levels and
includes individuals as well as nation-states. Employing a WST perspec-
tive, I see the trend of increasing the minimum age of marriage as a reflec-
tion of the principles of the global cultural order. With its emphasis on
conformity in global policy-making as a result of being exposed to
certain global norms, the WST perspective is useful for understanding
the global pattern of raising the legal marriage age.
It is not a coincidence that the first time the international community
moved toward institutionalisation of the ideal marriage came after World
War II. Although the international community was certainly operative
earlier in the form of international organisations, both IGOs and
INGOs, it was not until after the war that they were globally institutiona-
lised. A centralised global governance structure emerged in the form of
the United Nations, to which existing global civil society organisations
attached themselves (Boli & Thomas, 1999). These organisations,
especially INGOs, are the ‘structural backbone’ of world culture
through which world cultural ideas, principles and norms are debated
and expanded. Even though world cultural ideas about what an ideal
marriage is and why other forms may be particularly problematic for
women started to spread well before the 1950s, especially within some
feminist circles (Moschetti, 2005), those ideas did not find fertile
ground in which to grow, but eventually they proliferated and were trans-
lated into rationalised prescriptions for the conditions of the ideal mar-
riage and arguments about the negative causes and consequences of
non-ideal forms. With the increasing institutionalisation of the individ-
ual at the level of world society, marriages not based on freely given
consent by competent adults became problematic and illegitimate. It
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was not only international civil society that developed a definite position
against child marriage: constituted by similar cultural principles, nation-
states also started to enact laws against child marriage in this period.
According to WST, in a world where a global state that would enforce
world cultural norms and models does not exist, INGOs play a highly sig-
nificant role. Indeed, world-cultural models are embodied in and sus-
tained by INGOs. In addition to INGOs, global interstate agreements
also embody world cultural principles. Thus if a country is subject to
many global agreements and heavily involved with INGOs, it would be
considered relatively highly integrated into the world polity. As a
country is more integrated into the world polity, it will enact more
world-cultural principles that are typically institutionalised in inter-
national non-governmental organisations and IGOs. In the case of
child/forced marriage, the global trend is toward increasing the marriage
age, due to global cultural norms of individualism and sacralisation of
women and children. Following this, I hypothesise that the world-
polity embeddedness of a country is predictive of its legislation regarding
the minimum marriage age requirement.
Hypothesis 1: The greater the embeddedness in the world polity, the higher
the likelihood of passing legislation setting the minimum age of marriage at 18.
In addition to the influence of INGOs in general, membership in
women’s INGOs that work on the issue of child/forced marriage is particu-
larly important. Where local norms are shifting more to emphasise the
negative effects of child marriage, involvement with women’s INGOs
will be higher. Following this, I hypothesise that women’s INGOs’ efforts
are central for the state’s legislative reforms against child/forced marriage.
Hypothesis 2: The greater the involvement with women’s INGOs, the higher
the likelihood of passing legislation setting the minimum age of marriage at 18.
Finally, the ratification of certain international human rights instru-
ments is an important factor contributing to legislative changes.
Human rights instruments such as conventions and resolutions have
norm-setting power and should be predictive of legislative reforms. Inter-
national human rights instruments are important because ratifying them
indicates adhesion to global legitimations of the individual and individual
rights. For the issue of child marriage, treaties and conventions on
women and children are particularly important. I hypothesise that if a
country ratifies more treaties on children and women then it is more
likely to have stricter marriage age laws.
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Hypothesis 3: The more relevant conventions ratified, the higher the likeli-
hood of passing legislation setting the minimum age of marriage at 18.
Advocating women’s rights and child marriage – the role of
women politicians
The relationship between women’s presence in the parliament and the
representation of women’s interests is widely explored by political scien-
tists. Anne Phillips’ book, The Politics of Presence (1995), suggests that
women’s interests can best be represented by women politicians. The
main assumption behind this is that women share similar life experiences
and can anticipate each other’s needs best. She claims that women’s and
men’s experiences are different in the labor market, education, exposure
to violence, and child-rearing responsibilities, among others, so only
women politicians can and will address women’s issues. Other scholars
reached similar conclusions. To name a few, Kittilson (2008) found
that between 1970 and 2000, in 19 democracies, women’s presence in par-
liament increases the adoption of maternity and child care leave policies.
Swers (1998) study on congressional voting in the United States yields
similar results particularly with respect to abortion and women’s health
policies. Other case studies and comparative studies on representation
of women’s interests by women reach similar results (Celis, 2006;
Schwindt-Bayer & Mishler, 2005; Thomas, 1991) with a few exceptions
(Burnet, 2008; Devlin & Elgie, 2008).
The laws against child marriage can arguably be seen as laws promot-
ing gender equality and therefore strengthening women’s interests. There
are many cases where female parliamentarians either initiated the public
debates about child marriage or strongly supported the case of non-state
actors about it. Following this and the literature on the effects of female
parliamentarians, I hypothesise as follows:
Hypothesis 4: The greater the representation of women in the legislature,




This variable indicates whether or not a country has legislation setting the
minimumage ofmarriage at 18 in a given year. Given the problemswith an
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ordinal version of the variable,1 I created a dummy variable with just two
values. The variable is coded 1 if a country has a law that sets the marriage
age at 18, with or without exceptions, and 0 if the marriage age is below 18
(for either or both sexes) or a minimum age of marriage is absent. Thus I
combine ‘strictly 18’ and ‘18 with exceptions’ into one category and all
other cases into another. Although, ‘18 with exceptions’ is not the global
standard, it is still a move toward it. The second category, on the other
hand, clearly violates the international standard. Since I seek to explain
the global trend toward increasing the marriage age to the international
standard of 18 years old, this categorisation is appropriate.2 Kim, Longho-
fer, Boyle, and Nyseth (2013) coded marriage age laws for non-OECD
countries until the year 2011. As an addition to their data, I coded the
OECD countries and extended the data set to 2015. To code the years
after 2011, I predominantly usedGirls not Brides’webpage in which infor-
mation on any development on child marriage (including legislative
changes) can be found, country by country (Girls not Brides, 2017b). In
most cases, the country profiles provide information on the latest legisla-
tive changes. In some cases, I used the links to relevant reports provided in
country profiles. For 37 Asia-Pacific countries, I used the 2016 report,
‘Child, Early and ForcedMarriage Legislation in 37 Asia-Pacific countries’
by the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) and World Health Organisation
(WHO) (WHO, 2016). For African countries, I used The African Child
Policy Forum’s report on marriage age laws in Africa (ACPF, 2013). I
also used the World Law Guide (Lexadin) and World Policy Center data
(World Policy Center, 2017). If contradictory information emerged, I con-
sulted CRC and CEDAW country reports.3
For OECD countries, I used the CRC and CEDAW country reports,
the Council of Europe Family Policy Database, and a report by the
Policy Department (Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs) to the
European Parliament (Psaila et al., 2016).
Independent variables
Table 1 summarises the sources of data for independent variables and
controls. Below I discuss the operationalisation for each.
Embeddedness in the world polity
Following WST scholars, I use INGO memberships to measure the degree
of embeddedness or integration into the world polity. While far from ideal,
this measure of the breadth of INGOmemberships (the number of INGOs
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to which residents of each country belong) has become the standard
measure for this concept. The INGO data comes from the Yearbook of
International Organisations (2005 and 2013). The data for 1968–2005 are
from Mathias (2013), for 2005–2012 from Amahazion (2016). I extrapo-
lated the data for 2012–2015. The variable is logged to reduce skewness.
Involvement with women’s INGOs
In addition to general INGOmemberships, this variable considers INGOs
specifically working on women’s issues. It follows the same logic: INGOs
working on women’s issues carry global norms regarding women and
more involvement with these organisations increases adoption of these
norms. I measure involvement with women’s INGOs by the number of
INGOs about and for women to which each country’s residents belong.
The data is derived from a random sample of 25 organisations, stratified
by founding date, covering the period 1965–2005 (Frank & Mceneaney,
1999). I extrapolated the data to extend coverage to 2015.
Ratification of international treaties
According to world society theory, international human rights instru-
ments represent world cultural principles and their ratification strength-
ens the legitimacy of those principles. Here I focus on the ratification of





1 = marriage age set at 18, with or
without exceptions; 0 = marriage
age below 18 (for one or both
sexes) or no minimum age
Lee et al. 2012; GNB 2017; IPU 2016;
ACFP 2013; Lexadin 2016; World
Policy Center 2017; Psaila et al.




Number of INGOs in which residents
of a country are members





Number of women INGOs in which
residents of a country are
members
UIA 2005 (Frank, 2005)
Treaty ratifications Total number of ratifications of
treaties related to women’s/
children’s rights
UN Treaty Database
Female empowerment Proportion of seats held by women
in national parliaments
ICPRS – Women in Parliament,
1945–2003: Cross-National
Dataset (Paxton et al., 2008)
Religion Dummy variable. 1 = greater than
one half of population is Muslim/
Catholic/Protestant; 0 = less than
one half of population is Muslim/
Catholic/Protestant
Teorell et al (2011)
State capacity Government spending as a
proportion of GDP
World Bank Development Indicators
GDP per capita World Bank Development Indicators
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treaties dealing with children and women. Three international treaties are
particularly important: the Marriage Convention (1962), The Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
(1979), and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989). I add
two protocols to the original conventions as they are related to child mar-
riage. The first is the ‘Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights
of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and child porno-
graphy’ (2000). The second protocol is the Optional Protocol to
CEDAW (1999), which facilitates enforcement of the original convention
by opening the way to individual complaints about rights violations and
specifying procedures for investigating such complaints.
I coded this data to indicate the total number of these treaties and pro-
tocols ratified by each country in a given year from 1965 to 2015. The data
is available from the UN Treaties website (UN Treaties, 2017). In
addition to the total number of relevant ratifications, I created separate
variables for the 1962 Marriage Convention, the CRC and CEDAW to
examine their individual effects on the likelihood and rapidness of
passing legislation setting the minimum marriage age at 18.
Female empowerment
I measure female empowerment by the proportion of seats held by
women in national parliaments. The literature shows that the presence
of females in politics is a telling indicator of the strength of women’s
rights in a country (Phillips, 1995; Wängnerud, 2009). Data for this
measure is available from the Interuniversity Consortium for Political
and Social Research for 1965–2015 (ICPRS), Women in Parliament,
1945–2003: Cross-National Dataset (Paxton et al., 2008).
Controls
GDP per capita
GDP per capita is considered important for child marriage legislation
because higher rates of child marriage are correlated with higher rates
of poverty, as marrying girls off may be the only viable option for poor
families (Nguyen and Wodon, 2015). Thus less wealthy countries may
be less willing to pass legislation against child marriage. Conversely, low-
ering child marriage rates is now considered a way to facilitate economic
development. Thus, less wealthy countries may be more willing to pass
minimum-18 age of marriage legislation to increase their economic
growth. For this indicator, I use World Development Indicators data
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(2017) measured as current US dollars. The variable is logged to reduce
skewness.
Religion
Religion is a major element that shapes cultural systems, and it often
plays an influential role, directly or indirectly, in policy making. Religious
bodies often regulate familial, marital, and nuptial relations, and religion
is a major factor underlying attitudes about gender relations. Depending
on the dominant religious practices or beliefs, religion can thus be
strongly predictive of a society’s gender ideology, and its view of marriage
and the family. Accordingly, it is reasonable to consider religion as a
potential factor in policies concerning child marriage. Using the
Teorell et al data set (2011), I code countries as Catholic, Protestant, or
Muslim. The coding applies if more than 50% of the population is a
member of one of the three religions. The data set does not specify a reli-
gious identity if no one religion accounts for more than 50% of the popu-
lation. I supplemented this data with information from national bureaus
of statistics and the CIA Fact Book (2012) to code the remaining cases as
‘Other Christian’ or ‘Other Religion.’
State capacity
Child/forced marriages are mostly unregistered, in part because child
marriage is illegal but also because many states do not have effective
bureaucratic structures to register them. In the absence of effective
bureaucratic functionality, states cannot keep track of births and mar-
riages. If a state lacks information about the prevalence of child/forced
marriage in its territory, then it is unlikely that it will identify child mar-
riage as a problem and develop effective legislation against it. On the basis
of this assumption, I control for state capacity. Following Boyle et al.
(2016), I include government spending as a proportion of GDP as an
indicator of the capacity of the government.
Analysis
To analyse when countries adopt minimum age of marriage legislation, I
employ survival analysis, also known as event-history analysis. Survival
analysis is a statistical technique that is used when the dependent variable
is the occurrence of an event or ‘likelihood of occurrence of an event’
(Allison, 1984). In this study, the event in question is the enactment of
a law setting the marriage age at 18, with or without exceptions. Survival
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analysis captures a crucial aspect of longitudinal data that linear
regression cannot analyse: the factors that lead to early or late adoption
of the event. The event in question usually refers to a qualitative
change that occurs at a specific point in time (Allison, 1984, p. 9). Survival
analysis allows for descriptive and parametric analysis of data. The
former describes the overall rate an event, in this case the legislation
setting the minimum age of marriage at 18. The latter, allows for hypoth-
esis testing about the variables that have an impact on the event. Events
may occur just one time or they may recur. In my study, since marriage
age legislation only pass once (it does not go back to its earlier version
once it is passed). I use a discrete-time-method (ibid 16), Cox Pro-
portional Hazards Model, to determine the impact of independent vari-
ables on the hazard rate of passing the legislation over time (Cox, 1972).
In survival analysis, the risk-set consists of all countries that have not
passed laws setting the minimum age of marriage at 18 after the year
1965. Countries that had already passed such laws are excluded from the
analysis as their ‘risk’ of passing the law is always 0 (no country that
with a minimum-18 law has ever reverted to a younger marriage age law).
The survival analysis examines 135 countries for the period 1965–
2015. It excludes countries that had passed minimum-18 marriage age
legislation prior to 1965 as they were not ‘at-risk’ of passing such legis-
lation thereafter. I could not begin the analysis before 1965 due to lack
of data for many variables; thus I do not account for the 19 earliest adop-
ters of what would eventually become the global norm. However, my
period covers most of the legislation; the survival models analyse 85
failure events (where ‘failure’ means passing the legislation) between
1965 and 2015.
Except for the early legislators, each country’s ‘risk’ of passing the
legislation starts the year the country enters the data set. For most of
the countries this year is 1965, but some enter later at the time of inde-
pendence. I use the Cox Proportional Hazards model, which predicts
the effects of independent variables on the passage of legislation over
time.4 The dependent variable in the survival analysis is the legislation’s
timing, or the rate of event occurrence (Allison, 2010, p. 413). The analy-
sis tells us which variables affect how early a country passed the legis-
lation (or failed to do so). The hazard rate (the rate of event
occurrence) is then the probability that a country would pass the
minimum age of marriage legislation at time t. The year when the mar-
riage legislation passed is coded 1, while the years before and after are
coded 0. No country that has passed minimum-18 legislation has ever
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reverted to a law setting a minimum age below 18 (with or without excep-
tions). Thus, my dataset is organised as a ‘single-failure-per-subject’ situ-
ation; once the legislation has been passed, a country is no longer in the
risk-set.
Findings
Figure 2 shows that the hazard rate increased steadily over time and
started to decrease toward the end (the early 2000s), by which time
most of the countries had passed minimum-18 legislation. As of 1965,
only 19 countries had passed minimum age of marriage laws that set
the age at 18; by 2015, 110 countries had passed such legislation.
Between 1975 and 1985, there were only a few countries that passed legis-
lation. However, after 1990 the number of new legislative acts started to
increase significantly.5 This supports my hypothesis that states started to
pass legislation only after child marriage was institutionalised as a global
issue with conventions, particularly the CRC in 1989.
Table 2 presents the Cox regression results. Models 1–5 include world
society variables while the last two models test for the female
Figure 2. Smoothed Hazard Estimate: Minimum age of 18 legislation (135 Countries that
had passed minimum age legislation after 1965).
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representation hypothesis along with controls. I also test for different
conventions (Marriage Convention, the CEDAW, the CRC) in different
models and in those models the cumulative treat ratification variable is
excluded. Similarly, I also tested for membership in women INGOs in
some models in which the general INGO variable is excluded as these
are highly correlated.
My first hypothesis suggested that embeddedness in the world polity
would result in a higher likelihood of passing the minimum age 18 legis-
lation. Embeddedness, measured as membership in INGOs, does not
seem to be an important factor in predicting adoption of legislation. Simi-
larly, membership in women INGOs hypothesis is not supported. From
world society perspective this is surprising as previous research found
strong embeddedness as a strong predictive factor of policy adoption in
issues such as abolishment of death penalty (Matthias, 2013), organ
trafficking (Amahazion, 2016), rape laws (Frank, 2000) among others. As
an exception to other world society research, Brehm and Boyle’s (2018)
study on adoption of policies banning corporal punishment in schools
and homes also reported lack of association between embeddedness and
policy adoption. They suggest that INGO networks may have lost impor-
tance as different global civil society networks are formed. This line of
explanation also works for my case. The advocacy against child marriage
is not limited to INGOs, but include a wide array of actors.
Another explanation for the missing INGO effect may be the some-
what diffident language of INGOs, particularly international women’s
organisations about child marriage. Although starting from the late
1990s, international women’s organisations became more vocal about
child marriage, in the period before the CEDAW and CRC it was
almost a taboo subject. Moschetti (2005) discusses the history of the
international feminist movement’s involvement with child marriage.
She mainly discusses the interwar period, when a small number of
British and Indian feminists problematised child marriage as a form of
sexual slavery and a form of control of female body. Moschetti argues
that those feminists were marginalised; the majority of feminists did
not take up the issue. The post-1950s period was also not supportive of
those concerned about child marriage. Only after child marriage is con-
ceptualised as a children’s issue as opposed to women’s issue and after its
connection with HIV/AIDS and economic development is established,
more INGOs took the issue as a part of their advocacy campaigns. This
suggests that the INGO effect on the legislation against child marriage
is a relatively novel phenomenon, mainly starting from late 1990s on.6













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A final explanation of the lack of INGO effect is that after late 1990s
child marriage became such a compelling issue that everyone decided
to jump on the bandwagon except countries with a Muslim majority as
I discuss below. In other words, since the legislation trend was so perva-
sive, INGO membership became an insignificant factor to differentiate
legislators and non-legislators.
Unlike the embeddedness, another variable that suggests the relevance
of global factors in explaining the policy adoption, namely the treaty
ratification is significant across all models. This confirms hypothesis
3. What this suggests is that more treaty ratifications lead to earlier
passage of age-18 marriage legislation. I also checked for the relevance
of different treaties in two models (Model 2 and Model 6). I estimated
the analysis for the CRC, CEDAW, and Marriage Convention but
exclude the optional protocols to the CRC and the CEDAW because
they came so late in the period. Both of these models demonstrated the
particularly strong effect of the CRC in predicting the policy adoption.
This is in line with my theorising above, as child marriage is conceptual-
ised as an issue concerning children in the global level, states are more
willing to pass legislation against it. Returning to the basic smoothed
hazard estimate in Figure 1, the inflection point at the time of the CRC
was like a starting gun for legislation. After a warm-up period in previous
decades, during which a small proportion of countries passed age-18
laws, the race was suddenly on, and countries ever more eagerly joined
in the race to conform to the emergent global norm.
It is worth noting that the establishment of CEDAW does not appear
to have much significance compared to the CRC; no inflection point is
apparent in Figure 6 in the late 1970s. This shows that the issue of mar-
riage age is defined as a children’s rights issue rather than a women’s
issue. The international community conceptualises the issue within the
confines of children’s rights, which is reflected in the preferred terminol-
ogy: starting in the late 1990s, the term ‘child marriage’ came to the fore
while ‘early marriage’ and ‘forced marriage’ faded into the background. 7
Hypothesis 4 suggests that female presence in the parliament leads to
earlier adoption of minimum age-18 legislation. This hypothesis is con-
sistently supported across models. This is in line with existing research
which suggests that proportion of women in parliaments is correlated
with positive policy outcomes for women and children. In the case of
child marriage, the effect of women may be working in different ways.
They may be the ones that initiate change about child marriage or they
may be responding to demands for change from civil society groups. It
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is also possible women parliamentarians that are proactive about child
marriage are part of a global network that prioritises the issue. One
can think of recent examples such as Zimbabwe’s Jessie Majome, a
female parliamentarian, whose efforts ended up the abolition of child
marriage by the Constitutional Court of Zimbabwe in 2016. Majome is
a member of Parliamentarians for Global Action (PGA), an international
network of parliamentarians working on human rights, international
justice, equality, and security issues (PGA, 2018). PGA actively works
to mobilise parliamentarians around the world against child marriage.
In 2014, they launched the ‘PGA’s Parliamentary Campaign to End
Child Marriage’ and in 2015 presented a declaration in the UN General
Assembly which was signed by 729 parliamentarians in 77 countries.
By 2017, PGA member legislators contributed to reforms about child
marriage in several countries including Ghana, Costa Rica, Dominican
Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Trinidad & Tobago
(PGA, 2018).
Parliamentarians also built regional networks through which laws
about child marriage are discussed.8 In 2016, The Southern African
Development Community Parliamentary Forum adopted the Model
Law on Eradicating Child Marriage while Asian Forum on Parliamentar-
ians on Population and Development brought together parliamentarians
of 13 South Asian countries to discuss laws and policies about child mar-
riage in March 2016. In both events, a great majority of participants were
women.
The mobilisation around PGA is illustrative of how national legislative
reforms are mobilised by international networks. Therefore, consistent
positive effect of female presence in the parliament in policy adoption
can also be interpreted in relation to global factors. Global norms
empower organisations working on women’s and children’s issues,
women become more influential in national political processes, and
anti-child marriage policies are thereby promoted. The opposite can
also be true: a global standard about child marriage did not become
fully codified until after regional networks of women parliament
started to push for it.
Two control variables, religion and state capacity are significant in
explaining child marriage legislation. For religion, Muslim countries
are less likely to have passed legislation, and the effect is often but not
always significant. This finding is particularly interesting when con-
sidered in the context of the rise of political Islam in the second half of
1990s (Roy 2006; Tibi 2014). Political Islam posits itself as a cultural
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alternative to the dominant global culture. In that sense, globally institu-
tionalised notions of childhood, marriage or women’s empowerment are
either rejected or included selectively. Recent challenges against setting
the marriage age at 18 in countries with Muslim majorities are examples
of the relationship between political Islam and child marriage. Debates
over lowering the marriage age in Egypt in 2012 (Khayri, 2012); the
shift from strict marriage age laws to looser laws in Bangladesh (Guha,
2017), and Turkish government’s efforts to legitimise child marriage in
case of rape (Agerholm, 2016) are some instances of the contested pos-
ition of child marriage laws in Islamic contexts. As such, the issue of
child marriage becomes a part of the cultural war fought through
women bodies.
Finally, the state capacity variable reaches significance in five out of
seven models with positive effects. This is suggestive of the fact that rela-
tive size and capacity of the government matters in passing the legislation
relatively quick. This is probably because as the state capacity increases, it
extends its reach to more spheres of life, such as that of marriage and
becomes more regulative in capacity. States with greater capacity may
be inclined to think that they can actually reduce the practice –
though we have to keep in mind that passing legislation is largely
a symbolic normative act whose effects are likely to appear only in the
long run.
Overall, my findings suggest that establishment of global norms, in the
form of conventions and treaties, is key in understanding the diffusion of
legislation against child marriage. However, they are not enough by
themselves. World cultural norms need strategic actors operating
through national legislatures and across national boundaries to become
effective. Countries have passed these laws because the global system,
i.e. the world polity, has come to define child marriage as a problem
and charged states with acting to reduce this problem by setting the mar-
riage age at 18. But for these laws to be passed, women legislatures and
their regional networks played a significant role. Finally, my findings
suggest that contesting global notions of marriage became a symbolic
act for some Muslim majority countries.
Conclusion
The main puzzle this paper seeks to address is the global spread of laws
setting the minimum age of marriage at 18. What prompted countries to
pass such legislation? The findings from the survival analysis point out
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that involvement with the larger world and existence of women legis-
lators and their networks matter. Involvement with counter-scripts, in
this case possibly through political Islam, have a negative effect. Exposure
to global norms is particularly important as the initial force in passing
minimum age of marriage laws globally. Once norms about childhood
started to become institutionalised, largely a CRC effect, regardless of
their local characteristics, countries started to pass such laws. Countries
do not set the marriage age in relation to local customs or culture but
embrace the global norm. Moreover, once countries pass the minimum
age legislation, they do not revert back to the earlier versions or lower
the marriage age. At this point, it is an empirical question to what
extent this is reflective of the actual marriage age patterns or to what
extent such laws are actually implemented. Regardless, although they
may be symbolic, global norms are important in taking legislative steps
about child marriage.
However, global norms by themselves were not enough to push for
legislation. The relevance of women parliamentarians for the adoption
of the minimum age of marriage legislation suggests that norm travel
with the help of strategic actors such as regional networks of female par-
liamentarians. It may be true that women parliamentarians are more
likely to respond to the international treaties concerning women and
children and push for the legislation in accordance with the international
norms. It may also be true that presence of networks of women parlia-
mentarians helps the global standard to be fully codified.
The consistent support for the relevance of the ratification of treaties,
particularly that of the CRC, when read with the inconsistent support for
embeddedness in the world society measured by INGO involvement is
suggestive of the direct effect of the CRC on states that is not necessarily
mediated by INGOs. This maybe because preferences of INGOs for
stronger laws and implementation are in conflict with rather symbolic
moves of the states. They may be using other means of advocacy and
communication with international organisations and treaty monitoring
bodies such as shadow reporting.9 However, it may also be the case
that other actors are more important in pushing the states for legislation.
As discussed in the previous section, there is some anecdotal evidence for
the relevance of parliamentary networks particularly in African and Latin
American countries to explain passing minimum age 18 laws. It may also
be true that states are willing to ratify treaties concerning children and
pass legislation due to children’s rights being relatively less controversial.
That is to say, issues concerning children have a special moral status and
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it is easy to present them as above and beyond political divides. There-
fore, it is easy for states to pass legislation for the good of children
without risking any domestic political turmoil. In other words, passing
such legislation awards states with international legitimacy without the
risk of creating conflicts domestically.
The lack of INGO effect together with the significance of women legis-
lators have implications for understanding diffusion processes as
theorised by WST scholarship. As mentioned earlier, WST scholarship
theorises INGO networks as primary carriers of global norms. The case
of minimum age of marriage shows that local actors such as women poli-
ticians can also be carriers of such norms. One implication of this finding
for WST is that carriers of culture may be different for different issue
areas. INGOs are not equally effective in all areas. The sweeping INGO
argument may work for more public issues like education, trade while
it does not hold true for rather private issues such as marriage, divorce,
corporal punishment (ref) and alike. Cole and Perrier’s (2019) study
also find that INGOs are more effective in domains that are highly insti-
tutionalised. In this study, I do not unpack why women parliamentarians
are more effective in passing for legislation of minimum age of marriage.
This is an area of exploration for further research.
Finally, the negative effect of Muslim majority, is suggestive of a
counter script about ideal marriage, childhood, and gender roles based
on Islamic principles. This may be particularly true in contexts where
political Islam is strong and is seeking to present an alternative to the
global script. In these contexts, the legitimacy is not sought with reference
to global cultural conceptions of gender equality or ideal childhood but
with respect to ‘local’ practices. However, whether this is the case is an
empirical question which would require in-depth qualitative analysis of
different cases which is beyond the scope of this paper. One direction
for future researchers then is understanding more about how world cul-
tural models interact with local norms, that is, how local actors are
shaped by and, in turn, shape global norms and models. Some recent
scholarship in the world society tradition delves into this issue, by
relying on social surveys or qualitative methods such as in-depth inter-
views that explore how world cultural scripts interact with local attitudes
and beliefs (Boyle et al 2002, Hadler 2016, Qadir 2016).
The negative effect on Islam on minimum age of marriage legislation is
not surprising when considered in the context of previous WST scholar-
ship. Many WST studies find a negative Islam effect. Islam is negatively
correlated with the incidence of divorce (Wang and Schofer 2018),
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abolition of death penalty (Mathias 2013), labour force participation and
parliamentary representation of women (Russell 2015), women’s social
rights (Yoo 2012). Some WST studies on the domain of gender and sexu-
ality do not focus on Islam exclusively even when religion is a part of the
theorising (Frank 1999, Kim et al 2013). My findings suggest that a closer
look into how Islamic countries engage with global norms is needed par-
ticularly in the areas of gender and sexuality. With the current backlash
against feminism globally and politicisation of gender rights, this is more
relevant than ever (Cupać and Ebetürk 2020). Future WST research
should unpack the Islam effect. Does the negative Islam effect tell us a cul-
tural story? Is the negative effect limited to contexts where Islam is a pol-
itical project? Do different versions of Islam have different effects? Is it
possible to claim that Islamic countries are centres from which a
different script diffuses from? These are some of the questions that WST
scholarship can explore for a novel understanding of diffusion and con-
testation patterns.
Another relevant question this study has not examined is whether
passing age-18 marriage laws actually changes child marriage rates. This
is a question addressed in some other works influenced by the world
society perspective (Boyle 2005, Boyle and Kim 2009, Kim and Boyle
2012, Kim et al. 2013, Longhofer & Schofer 2010). Among these studies,
some provide support for the effect of global norms on actual implemen-
tation of laws while others find no such relationship. For instance, Kim
et al. (2013) found that in countries where marriage age laws adhere strictly
to global norms, the rates of adolescent fertility are lower. However, Boyle’s
(2002) work on female genital mutilation (FGM) concluded that, although
global norms are effective in the emergence of new norms about the prac-
tice, they may not actually decrease the rates of FGM. Following this body
of work, it is important to account for the issue of ‘when laws matter’ in
decreasing the actual rates of child marriage.
Notes
1. I also coded the dependent variable as an ordinal variable, from no laws to
strict laws. (1 = strictly 18, 2 = 18 with exceptions, 3 = not set/below 18).
The first category sets the age at 18 without exceptions. However, this
ordinal variable turned out to be a non-viable option for two reasons: only
19 countries (of 167) have a strict law setting the minimum age at 18, and
most of these laws were passed since the late 1990s. This created a dependent
variable with only 5% of the observations in the category, which led to
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uninterpretable results skewed heavily toward the latter part of the analysis
period.
2. It is important to note that in many cases the minimum age of marriage laws
allow for exceptions such as parental consent, court approval, pregnancy or
recognition of religious/customary law. When all exceptions are taken into
consideration, 18 as the minimum age of marriage is far from being the
norm. However, when countries pass laws that reform the marriage age, it is
always the case they set it up to 18, albeit with exceptions. This indicates
some approval of the global norm. In 47 countries, where the minimum age
of marriage is currently below 18 (see Appendix), whenever there is a push
for raising the minimum age of marriage by legislators and advocates, the
goal has always been to raise it to 18, not an earlier age.
3. In some cases, such as the USA, because of the lack of a federal level legislation,
the marriage age is coded as below 18. Longitudinal comparative data does not
exist for federal level laws. The decision to code such cases in the category of
‘below 18/no law’ is the most consistent option within such data limitations.
Further research should be conducted to account for the mismatch for
federal and state level legislations of child marriage.
4. One of the assumptions of the Cox model is event occurrence at different times
or non-existence of ties (Borucka, 2014; Matthias, 2013). As legislation events
involve many ties –more than one country passes legislation in a single year –
this assumption is violated. I corrected for this problem by using the Efron
method in the Cox regressions (Matthias, 2013; Efron, 1977).
5. I tested the Cox model’s proportional hazard assumption by using the Schoen-
feld residuals test (Matthias, 2013; Schoenfeld, 1982). All of the models pass
the ‘phtest’ indicating that proportional hazards assumption is met in each
of them.
6. To test this, I estimated the models for the period after 2000 only. Those
models provide some support for the effect of INGOs particularly after late
1990s hypothesis. I rerun all models that has either INGO orWINGO variable,
which adds up to six models. In three of these six models, either INGO or
WINGO variable is significant and positive. The effect of CRC and female par-
liamentarians ceases to exist in these models. I do not include those models for
brevity. The tables are available upon request.
7. To check whether framing child marriage as a children’s rights issue is predic-
tive of passing legislation against it, I tested other variables which would indi-
cate empowerment of children. I added female secondary school enrollment
rates as a control variable however this variable did not reach significance in
any of the models. The absence of such effect may suggest two things:
passing the minimum age of marriage legislation is simply a relatively costless
act by the states compared to investing in girls’ education or enrollment rates is
not good measure of children’s empowerment. However, it is the only measure
that is available for the period and on a global scale.
8. It would be ideal to include an independent variable testing the role of women
legislators’ regional networks. However, there is no systematic data on regional
networks for the period and states covered by this study.
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Appendix
Year minimum age set at 18 (if changed after 1965).
Country
Year minimum age of marriage is set to 18 (from not-set/below
18 to 18, with or without exceptions)a,b
1 Ivory Coast * 1967
2 Zambia 1967
3 Netherlands 1970
4 Mauritius ° 1971












17 Algeria * 1987
18 Congo Rep 1987
19 Libya 1987
20 Burkina Faso 1989
21 Haiti 1989
22 San Marino 1989
23 Vietnam * 1989
24 Belgium 1990
25 Germany ° 1990
26 Namibia ° 1990
27 Philippines * 1990
28 Angola 1991
29 Australia 1991
30 Rwanda * 1991
31 Cambodia 1992
32 Czech Republic ° 1993
33 Iceland 1993
34 Laos 1993
35 Slovakia ° 1993
36 Estonia ° 1994




41 El Salvador * 1997
42 Latvia ° 1997
43 Georgia * 1998
44 Russia 1998
45 Sri Lanka/Ceylon 1998
46 Bhutan * 1999
47 Trinidad and Tobago 1999
48 Lithuania 2000






Year minimum age of marriage is set to 18 (from not-set/below
18 to 18, with or without exceptions)a,b
51 Central African Republic 2001
52 Ghana * 2001
53 Kazakhstan 2001
54 Kyrgyz Republic * 2001
55 South Africa 2001
56 Belarus 2002
57 Djibouti 2002
58 Mongolia * 2002
59 Serbia 2002
60 Belize 2003
61 Ethiopia * 2003
62 Maldives 2003
63 Botswana * 2004






















86 Nepal * 2009
87 Romania 2009
88 Sierra Leone 2010
89 Tajikistan 2010
90 Guinea * 2011
91 South Korea 2011
92 Liberia * 2011
93 Azerbaijan 2012
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Continued.
Country
Year minimum age of marriage is set to 18 (from not-set/below
18 to 18, with or without exceptions)a,b
97 Switzerland 2013
98 Chad 2015
* The age of marriage is 18 without exceptions.
° Marriage age was set at 18 upon independence/new state formation.
aIf the minimum legal age of marriage was already 18 in 1965, the country is excluded from this list.
Please find a list of these countries in the following page.
bSources: Melchiorre (2004), Kim et al (2013), World Policy Center (2017), CRC and CEDAW country
reports, Lexadin (2016).
cPanama raised the minimum age of marriage to 18 with exceptions in 2000. In 2015, the marriage age
was set at 18 without exceptions.
dKenya raised the minimum age of marriage to 18 with exceptions in 2004. In 2014, the marriage age
was set at 18 without exceptions.
Countries in which the marriage age was 18 (with or without exceptions) by the year
1965.
Country



















*The age of marriage is 18 without exceptions.
Countries in which the marriage age is below 18 for either or both sexes, or no mar-





















































aOn 30 April 2015, the Chamber of Deputies approved a reform of Article 148 of the Federal Civil Code in
order to establish full age (18 years) as the requirement for entering into marriage, but this reform has
not officially entered into force.
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